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The voluntary self exclusion program has been designed as one attempt to 
minimise the harm caused by problem gambling and electronic gaming 
machines. However, the program’s role as a genuine regulatory response is 
questionable. Few reporting requirements for gaming corporations and a 
reliance on an unsophisticated method of detecting self-excluded problem 
gamblers significantly undermine the purpose of the program. This paper 
considers the liability of gaming venues and corporations in circumstances 
where a self-excluded problem gambler has not been successfully excluded 
from the gaming venue. It is suggested that, in entering into the program, a 
problem gambler may be under a reasonable expectation that the gaming 
venue will assist in his or her endeavour to control the problematic 
gambling. Drawing primarily on the laws of Victoria, this article will 
discuss how the voluntary self-exclusion program is in need of reform so 
that it can better act as a harm minimisation mechanism. Further, the 
article will explore possible legal redress in contract, equity and under the 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), for problem gamblers who have 
participated in an ineffective voluntary self-exclusion program.  
I INTRODUCTION 
In October 2009, the Productivity Commission published a draft report, 
entitled Gambling, providing an update on developments that have occurred 
within the gambling industry since the Productivity Commission’s report, 
Australia’s Gambling Industries, published in 1999.1
                                                 
*BA, LLB(Hons), Monash University. The author wishes to thank Dr Jeannie Marie Paterson, 
Melbourne Law School, for her helpful comments, insights and guidance on this article. Any 
errors remain those of the author.  
 The draft report 
1 At the time of writing, the Productivity Commission had sent a final report to the Australian 
Government for its consideration on the 26 February 2010. The report is yet to be released. 
See Productivity Commission, Gambling – Public Inquiry (23 June 2010) Australian 
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considers a range of issues, including: the nature and definition of gambling; 
the participation in gambling, with a particular emphasis on problem 
gamblers; the economic and social impacts of the gambling industries; and the 
effects of the regulatory structure. In its 2009 Gambling report, the 
Productivity Commission places particular emphasis on electronic gaming 
machines (EGMs), which the Commission found accounted for around three 
quarters of the cases of severe problem gambling.2 At the time of the draft 
report, it was noted that there were approximately 198 303 EGMs nationally 
that caused 85 per cent of problem gambling.3
The Productivity Commission’s 2009 draft report builds on concerns that have 
repeatedly been raised in regard to the socially detrimental impact of EGMs. 
In particular, the now infamous article, Gambling with People’s Lives, 
published in The Age in 2003, reported that Tattersalls, a leading gaming 
corporation, was deliberately targeting problem gamblers in Victoria.
 Further, the Commission found 
that two thirds of gaming losses — about $12 billion a year — occurred on 
EGMs. Perhaps what is most concerning is that the report identified that about 
40 per cent to50 per cent of EGM revenue comes from problem gamblers. 
This means that almost half of the revenue generated by EGMs is as a result 
of the serious gambling addiction of approximately 1 per cent to 3 per cent of 
Australia’s public.  
4 The 
article alleged that, according to data gathered by Tattersalls, 15 per cent of 
those who play on EGMs do so excessively, and are responsible for 57 per 
cent of the gaming corporation’s revenue. Further, it was reported that a 
leaked Tattersalls’ document acknowledged this gross disparity between the 
percentages by stating that ‘[w]e derive enormous value…from a very small 
group of customers’.5 The document identified this ‘very small group of 
customers’ as Tattersalls’ target market group.6
                                                                                                                    
Government Productvitiy Commission <
 This ‘very small group of 
customers’ who gamble excessively, and on whom gaming corporations are 
http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/gambling-
2009>.  
2 Productivity Commission Gambling, Draft Report (2009), 1.3. 
3 ‘Gambling Report Lays Cards on the Table for States’ The Age, Melbourne, 23 October 2009, 
16.  
4 Anne O’Casey and James Doughney, ‘Gambling with People’s Lives’, The Age (Melbourne), 
15 October 2003, 15. See also James Doughney, ‘Ethical Gambling? Not from Tattersalls’, 
The Age (online), 26 March 2004 < http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/03/25/ 
1079939782618.html>.  
5 O’Casey and Doughney, ‘Gambling with People’s Lives’, above n 4, 15.  
6 O’Casey and Doughney, ‘Gambling with People’s Lives’, above n 4, 15; Doughney, ‘Ethical 
Gambling?’, above n 4. 
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reliant for quite a significant proportion of their profit, might be termed 
‘problem gamblers’ for reasons discussed below. 
Concerns over the social issues associated with problem gambling have 
prompted a range of measures designed to minimise the harm caused by 
problem gambling.7 One such type of measure is the ‘voluntary self-exclusion 
program’.8 The basic premise of the voluntary self-exclusion program is that a 
problem gambler can request to be banned from a gaming venue and/or to be 
removed from the gaming corporation’s mailing list.9
This article argues that the efficacy of voluntary self-exclusion programs as a 
regulatory response to problem gambling is questionable. There are few 
reporting requirements for gaming corporations administering such programs, 
which makes it difficult to monitor the effectiveness of the programs.
  
10 
Further, there are a number of factors that render the current voluntary self-
exclusion programs incapable of successfully facilitating the exclusion of 
problem gamblers. Case law suggests that at least some self-excluded problem 
gamblers continue to gamble at the venue without being detected.11
                                                 
7 In Victoria, for example, the state government has specifically endeavoured to address the 
issue of problem gambling through the introduction of various policies and strategies. These 
initiatives are wide ranging and include: ensuring a more socially responsible gambling 
industry, protecting vulnerable communities, and, most importantly, improving consumer 
protection. For further information see Office of Gaming and Racing, Department of Justice 
(Vic), Taking Action on Problem Gambling: A Strategy for Combating Problem Gambling in 
Victoria (2006) (‘A Strategy for Combating Problem Gambling’).  
 This is 
8 Productivity Commission, Australia’s Gambling Industries, Inquiry Report No 10 (1999) vol 
2 (Part D) (‘Australia’s Gambling Industries, vol 2’) 16.67. See also The South Australian 
Centre for Economic Studies, ‘Evaluation of Self-exclusion Programs and Harm Minimisation 
Measures: Report A’ (Research Report, Adelaide & Flinders Universities, February 2003 
(‘Evaluation of Self-exclusion Programs’); Department of Justice (Vic); Taking Action on 
Problem Gambling: Responsible Gambling Codes of Conduct and Self-Exclusion Programs, 
(Information Paper, Victorian Government, May 2008) (‘Responsible Gaming Codes of 
Conduct’).  
9 See, eg, the Australian Hotels Association Victoria website, which discusses the Self-
exclusion Gambling Online (SEGO) program. This program is aimed at individuals who 
experience problems with gambling: Australia Hotels Association, Self-exclusion (2008) 
Australia Hotels Association <http://www.ahavic.com.au/selfexclusion.php> (‘Self-
exclusion’). For an example of a ‘Deed of Self-exclusion’ see Australia Hotels Association, 
SEGO – Self Excluded Gamblers Online (2008) Australia Hotels Association 
<http://www.ahavic.com.au/deed/index.html>. 
10 Evaluation of Self-exclusion Programs, above n 8, vi. 
11 Ibid vii. See, eg, Foroughi v Star City Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1503 (27 September 2007) 
(‘Foroughi’); Reynolds v Katoomba RSL All Services Club Ltd [2001] NSWCA 234 (20 
September 2001) (‘Reynolds’); Preston v Star City Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 1273 (1 February 
2000) [87].  
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unsurprising given that, typically, venues rely only on an unsophisticated 
method of ‘facial recognition’ by their employees as a way of detecting 
banned patrons.12 Moreover, as the leaked Tattersalls’ document 
demonstrates, there may be considerable incentives for gaming corporations 
to encourage the patronage of problem gamblers. Gaming venues may even 
induce problem gamblers in the program to return to, and gamble at, the 
venue.13
This article considers the circumstances in which a problem gambler who has 
entered into a voluntary self-exclusion program, but has failed to be excluded 
from the gaming venue, may be able to bring a private legal action against the 
gaming corporation seeking compensation for losses incurred as a result of 
continuing to gamble at the venue. This article argues that there are limited 
legal responsibilities imposed on gaming corporations and venues in operating 
voluntary self-exclusion programs. Courts have not been receptive to claims 
for damages by self-excluded problem gamblers against gaming corporations, 
emphasising instead the personal responsibility of the problem gambler for his 
or her gambling losses. The article argues that this approach underestimates 
the compulsive nature of problem gambling, and places insufficient 
responsibility on a gaming corporation to implement effective self exclusion 
programs.  
  
Where a problem gambler enters into a voluntary self-exclusion program, the 
individual has taken steps to control his or her own gambling, and may have a 
reasonable expectation that the gaming venue will assist in that task. It is 
argued that some degree of legal responsibility should be imposed on a 
gaming corporation that has an inadequate system for identifying participants 
in its voluntary self-exclusion program, gives a false impression of the 
effectiveness of that program, or continues to encourage problem gamblers to 
gamble. This issue of legal responsibility is part of a larger question of how to 
improve voluntary self-exclusion programs to ensure that they operate as a 
meaningful regulatory response to problem gambling.  
Drawing primarily on the laws of Victoria, this article seeks to demonstrate 
that the current voluntary self-exclusion program is in need of substantial 
reform in order to afford the problem gambler adequate protection. Part II of 
the article begins with a brief examination of problem gambling and the 
personal and social consequences associated with it. Parts III to IV consider 
the possibility of a problem gambler, who has participated in an ineffective 
                                                 
12 Evaluation of Self-exclusion Programs, above n 8, vii; see, eg, Foroughi [2007] FCA 1503 
(27 September 2007). 
13 See, eg, Kakavas v Crown Ltd [2007] VSC 526 (8 December 2009). 
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voluntary self-exclusion program, seeking redress for the failure of that 
program in contract, equity and under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) 
(‘TPA’) for misleading and deceptive conduct and for unconscionable 
conduct. Several options for reform are suggested in the article. It is hoped 
that, as a result, the debate can progress to the point where appropriate reform 
can be implemented.  
II PROBLEM GAMBLING 
A Definition 
Over the years, gambling has become an inherent part of Australian culture.14 
For many members of the population, gambling is ‘a generally socially 
accepted and commercially important leisure activity’.15 However, in some 
instances, a person may begin exhibiting frequent, uncontrolled gambling 
behaviour. Terminology to describe such behaviour has included 
‘pathological’, ‘excessive’, ‘compulsive’, ‘addictive’ and ‘problem’ 
gambling.16
a progressive behaviour disorder in which an individual has a 
psychologically uncontrollable preoccupation and urge to gamble. This 
results in excessive gambling, the outcome of which compromises, disrupts 
or destroys the gambler’s personal life, family relationships or vocational 
pursuits. These problems in turn lead to intensification of the gambling 
behaviour. The cardinal features are emotional dependence on gambling, 
loss of control and interference with normal functioning.
 Problem gambling has also been viewed as a mental disorder. 
According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM IV) of the American Psychiatric Association, problem gambling is: 
17
                                                 
14 See, eg, Australian Institute for Gambling Research, ‘Australian Gambling Comparative 
History and Analysis’ (Project Report, Victorian Casino and Gaming Authority, October 
1999) 12–18. 
  
15 M Dickerson et al, ‘Definition and Incidence of Problem Gambling, Including the Socio-
economic Distribution of Gamblers’ (Report, Victorian Casino and Gaming Authority, 1997) 
103. 
16 Geoffrey T Caldwell et al, ‘Social Impact Study, Civic Section 19 Development and Casino: 
Casino Development for Canberra’ (Social Impact Report, AGPS, 1988) 36; see also 
Dickerson et al, above n 15.  
17 American Psychiatric Association (1995) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, Fourth Edition, American Psychiatric Association, Washington DC, [312.31]. 
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The definition provided by the DSM IV has been criticised by some 
commentators18 who argue that it does not allow for the fact that the harm 
arising out of gambling is contextually based; that is to say, that the harm 
experienced from gambling will be relative to the individual’s personal 
financial status.19
In Australia, problem gambling is most commonly defined in terms of its 
social impact, rather than through a medical interpretation of the condition as 
an addiction.
  
20 Most notably, it appears that Australia is currently the only 
country in which a research-based definition is used that makes no reference 
to diagnostic criteria.21
the situation when a person’s gambling activity gives rise to harm to the 
individual player, and/or to his or her family, and may extend into the 
community.
 Thus, the Australian Institute for Gambling Research 
has defined problem gambling as: 
22
This research-based definition has been adopted by several jurisdictions in 
Australia. For example, the Casino Control Act 1982 (Qld) states that a 
problem gambler is someone: 
 
whose behaviour relating to gambling –  
(a) is characterised by difficulties in limiting the amount of money or time 
the person spends on gambling; and  
(b) leads to adverse consequences for the person, other persons or the 
community.23
                                                 
18 See Michael Walker, ‘The Medicalisation of Gambling as an “Addiction”’ in Jan McMillen 
(ed), Gambling Cultures: Studies in History and Interpretation (Routledge, 1996), 204, 224–
39; see also Dickerson et al, above n 15, 104. 
 
19 Dickerson et al, above n 15, 103. 
20 See, eg, Dickerson et al, above n 15; see also James Doughney, ‘Ethical Blindness, EGMs 
and Public Policy: A Tentative Essay Comparing the EGM and Tobacco Industries’ (2007) 
5(4) International Journal of Mental Health Addiction 311, 311–319. 
21 Cf South Oaks Gambling Screen and Canadian Problem Gambling Index in The South 
Australian Centre for Economic Studies, ‘Measurement of Prevalence of Youth Problem 
Gambling in Australia: Report on Review of Literature’ (Final Report, Adelaide and Flinders 
Universities, December 2003), 7–11, 15. 
22 Dickerson et al, above n 15, 106. 
23 Casino Control Act 1982 (Qld) sch 1. For an example of a definition of problem gambling by 
reference to the examples and behaviours that are related to harm see Gambling and Racing 
Control (Code of Practice) Regulations 2002 (ACT) sch 1, cl 1.2. 
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Nevertheless, not all jurisdictions have elected to define problem gambling 
within legislation. For example, in Victoria, the Casino Control Act 1991 
(Vic) (‘CCA’) does not define the term ‘problem gambler’ at all.24 Some 
commentators have advocated that, for the purpose of consistency, a national 
definition should be adopted.25
The next part of this article will discuss the social and economic impact of 
problem gambling.  
 However, since it is beyond the scope of this 
article to debate whether or not a national definition should be adopted, an 
extensive discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of doing so is 
omitted.  
B The Magnitude of Problem Gambling 
Gambling participation in Australia has been described as one of the highest 
among English-speaking nations.26 Nationally, it has been estimated that 
approximately 3 per cent of the population in Australia are ‘problem 
gamblers’27 with a further 0.6 per cent being described as ‘at risk’ of 
developing gambling problems.28 This small percentage of the population 
contributes to approximately one third of total expenditure on gambling in 
Australia.29
                                                 
24 See also Casino Control Act 1992 (NSW). 
 The turnover in the industry is substantial. According to the 
Productivity Commission’s 2009 draft report, Australians spend 
25 Some commentators advocate that problem gambling should be ‘characterised by difficulties 
in limiting money and/or time spent on gambling which leads to adverse consequences for the 
gambler, others, or for the community’. See Penny Neal, Paul Delfabbro and Michael O’Neil, 
Problem Gambling and Harm: Towards a National Definition (Report, Department of Justice 
(Vic), 2005) 124–9. 
26 Dixie Statham, Genetic Epidemiology of Pathological Gambling (March 2004) Genetic 
Epidemiology, Molecular Epidemiology and Queensland Statistical Genetics Laboratories 
Studies <http://genepi.qimr.edu.au/studies/ga/?studycode=GA>. For an analysis within the 
Australian context see also Andrew Worthington et al, ‘Gambling Participation in Australia: 
Findings from the National Household Expenditure Survey’ (2007) 5(2) Review of Economics 
of the Household 209, 209–21.  
27 See Australian Institute of Criminology and PricewaterhouseCoopers, ‘Serious Fraud in 
Australia and New Zealand’ (Research and Public Policy Series, No 48, Australian Institute of 
Criminology, 2003). 
28 See, eg, Australian Institute for Gambling Research, Social and Economic Impacts of 
Gambling in New Zealand (Final Report, Australian Institute for Gambling Research, July 
2001). 
29 Yuka Sakurai and Russell Smith, ‘Gambling as a Motivation for the Commission of 
Financial Crime’ (Research Paper, No 256, Australian Institute of Criminology, June 2003) 
2–3. 
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approximately $18 billion a year on gambling.30 Almost a decade ago, the 
Australian gambling industry ‘generated over $11 billion in net takings and 
$650 million in commissions … for government’31
In order to better understand the mechanics of the gambling industry, it is 
useful to consider the state of Victoria in more detail. Victoria has been 
described as a ‘poker machine state’.
 and had a turnover of 
$94.5 billion.  
32 The gambling industry is dominated 
by three major gaming corporations — Tabcorp, Tattersalls, and Crown. The 
revenue generated by gambling losses is dispersed as follows: the state 
government receives more than one third in taxes, an approximate one third is 
divided between Tabcorp and Tattersalls, and the remainder is divided 
between Crown and the (mostly chain-owned) hotels and clubs, in which 
Tabcorp and Tattersalls place EGMs.33
In Victoria, EGMs are known to be specifically targeted at communities of 
relatively low socioeconomic status (SES). Gaming corporations place more 
machines per capita in those areas that are known to be of a lower SES than 
those of higher SES.
  
34 During the initial stages of the industry, representatives 
would openly admit that this was indeed the intention of the gambling service 
providers. Such representatives described the EGMs as a ‘blue collar form of 
entertainment’.35
This is a poor man’s sport, playing gaming machines. It is simple, 
unstimulating and non-interactive but more poor, lesser educated like it 
more than do rich, educated people.
 As a Clubs Victoria representative once stated: 
36
In response to this type of practice, the Victorian Commission for Gambling 
Regulation
  
37
                                                 
30 Ross Gittins, ‘Growth Comes at a Cost, and Sometimes Happiness Pays’ The Age 
(Melbourne) 28 October 2009, 17. 
 — an independent statutory body responsible for the regulation 
31 Productivity Commission, Australia’s Gambling Industries, Inquiry Report No 10 (1999) vol 
1 (Part A-C) (‘Australia’s Gambling Industries, vol 1’), 2.10. 
32 James Doughney, ‘The Poker-machine State in Australia: A Consideration of Ethical and 
Policy Issues’ (2006) 4(4) International Journal of Mental Health Addiction 351, 351. 
33 Ibid 361. 
34 Australia’s Gambling Industries, vol 1, above n 31, [10.1]–[10.5].  
35 James Doughney, The Poker Machine State; Dilemma in Ethics, Economics and Governance 
(Common Ground Publishing, 2002) 21. 
36 Australia’s Gambling Industries, vol 1, above n 34, [10.43]. 
37 Gambling Regulation Act 2003 (Vic); Casino Control Act 1991 (Vic); Casino (Management 
Agreement) Act 1993 (Vic). 
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of Victoria’s gambling industry — imposed significant restrictions on 
Tabcorp and Tattersalls in respect of the placement of EGMs. Further, in 
2006, a ‘regional capping’ policy38 was introduced, a policy that doubled the 
number of capped regions and extended the boundaries of already existing 
metropolitan regions. Nineteen regions became capped at 10 EGMs per 
thousand adults, which resulted in the removal of up to 540 EGMs from low 
SES communities.39 Further, the regions that already had 10 EGMs per 
thousand adults would be capped at a lower density. However, some 
commentators maintain that this has made little tangible difference as lower 
SES communities are still the most vulnerable and experience the most 
harmful gambling losses.40
To further illustrate the magnitude of problem gambling, it is useful to 
consider the previously discussed information held by Tattersalls — and 
potentially by Tabcorp — through data collection via respective loyalty 
membership schemes. When EGMs were still in their relative infancy in the 
state of Victoria, industry representatives commented that 80 per cent of total 
losses were derived from 20 per cent of EGM users.
  
41
What we must understand is: what do these customers look like? i.e. 
demographic, behaviours, attitudes and psychographics displayed. Once this 
is understood, we will know how best to market to these groups and 
influence their decisions to make Tatts Pokies venues preferred 
destinations.
 Since then, 
representatives have ceased making such statements, and it was not until 2003 
that subsequent information was made available to the public. In 2003, 
information was leaked from within Tattersalls concerning data that was 
collected from a card-based loyalty membership scheme. Such data had been 
gathered from the ‘Tatts Pokies Advantage Program’. The scheme allowed for 
members’ behaviour to be tracked when they used the loyalty card issued 
under the scheme in any of the venues owned by Tatts. The purpose of the 
data was to allow better marketing of Tatts venues:  
42
                                                 
38 A Strategy for Combating Problem Gambling, above n 7. 
  
39 Ibid 4.  
40 See Michael O’Neil et al, Study of the Impact of Caps on Electronic Gaming Machines (Final 
Report, Department of Justice (Vic), February 2005). 
41 Doughney, above n 32, 360. 
42 O’Casey and Doughney, ‘Gambling with People’s Lives’, above n 4, 15. See also Jonathan 
Holmens, Interview with Duncan Fisher (Television Interview, Four Corners, 2 October 
2003) <http://www.abc.net.au/cgi-bin/common/printfriendly.pl?/4corners/content/2003/ 
20031013_georges_gold/int_fischer.htm>. 
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Further findings from the document included the following: 
1. That the data gathered from the card-based loyalty membership 
scheme was an accurate approximation of EGM users in general,43
2. That Tattersalls was anxious about revealing such data to regulatory 
bodies, as it was confident that this information would attract some 
form of liability.
 
which allowed for relevant stakeholders to make informed judgments 
about the industry.  
44
3. That the purpose of the scheme was to target ‘high turnover’ users, 
otherwise known as heavy users, and entice them to remain at the 
machines longer.
  
45
4. That women were the primary focus of marketing initiatives, as it was 
found that two thirds of the revenue generated by Tatts came from 
female consumers. Thus, ‘promotions should generally not be based 
on the preferences of male customers’.
  
46
5. That consumers were generally in the older age group; in particular, it 
was found that problem gamblers commonly belonged to the 46-55 
year old cohort.
 
47
6. That, although those who used EGMs in the daytime did not 
necessarily lose more than those who did so in the evening,
 
48
The document further indicated that, ‘34% of members who spend ... greater 
than $50 per visit contribute over 82% of value’.
 this did 
undermine the image promoted by gaming corporations that ‘a 
harmless night out at the pokies’ is the main source of the industry’s 
revenue.  
49
                                                 
43 Doughney, above n 35, 42.  
 Additional evidence 
revealed that the 15 per cent of heavy gamblers who spend an average of 
about 150 minutes ‘playtime’ each visit, will usually visit more than once per 
44 Ibid.  
45 Ibid 45.  
46 Ibid 26.  
47 Ibid 43.  
48 Ibid 44.  
49 As quoted in Doughney, above n 32, 353.  
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month and do not restrict their visits to just one venue.50 Thus, approximately 
60 per cent of losses are derived from 15 per cent of EGM users who lose 
more than $100 every 2 hours.51
III VOLUNTARY SELF-EXCLUSION PROGRAMS 
  
Voluntary self-exclusion programs in gaming venues may operate as part of a 
voluntary industry code of practice52 or may be mandated by legislation.53 
The gambling industry in Australia operates pursuant to more than 30 
voluntary codes of practice54 applying across all states and territories.55
Venues should be accountable by public reporting of data, that they have 
adequate staff training and allocation and surveillance to provide a workable 
infrastructure for gamblers who desire to self-exclude. Accordingly, 
members of the AGC facilitating self-exclusion will develop systems and 
programs that seek to meet these principles in consultation with the 
appropriate treatment services and other relevant stakeholders, and 
according to their own particular and jurisdictional circumstances.
 
Perhaps the most notable code is the Australian Gaming Council Strategy for 
Responsible Gambling, which applies nationally across Australia. The Code 
begins by indicating the overarching principles of a voluntary self-exclusion 
program and then states that:  
56
                                                 
50 Doughney, above n 35, 45.  
  
51 Doughney, above n 32, 360–4.  
52 For example, as part of the Gaming Machines Operators Code of Practice, Tabcorp and 
Tattersalls agree to promote responsible gaming by providing, among other things, the 
‘availability and promotion of self-exclusion procedures’.  
53 See, eg, Casino Control Act 1991 (Vic); Casino Act 1997 (SA); Casino Control Act 1992 
(NSW).  
54 See, eg, ACT Gambling and Racing Control Code of Practice (ACT); Tabcorp Responsible 
Gambling Code of Practice (NSW); Australian Hotels Association (NSW) Responsible 
Conduct of Gambling (NSW); NT Code of Practice for Responsible Gambling (NT); 
Queensland Responsible Gambling Code of Practice (Qld); Gaming Machine Venue Code of 
Practice (SA); Wrest Point Casino Responsible Service of Gaming Policy (Tas); Tabcorp 
Responsible Gambling Code of Practice (Vic).  
55 Australian Gaming Council, ‘Responsible Gambling in Australia’ (Fact Sheet, AGC FS 
22/08, Australasian Gaming Council, November 2008, 1–2.  
56 Responsible Gaming Strategy, Australasian Gaming Council <http://www.austgaming 
council.org.au/images/pdf/resp%20gamb%20strat.pdf> 3–5. 
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In Victoria, there are currently nine57
• To conduct their business in a manner that precludes the following 
persons from entering their restricted gaming rooms:  
 operating codes of practice that are 
relevant to the gambling industry. In particular, the codes that are most 
relevant in the context of EGMs and voluntary self-exclusion programs are 
the Gaming Machines Operators Code of Practice and the Licensed Venue 
Operators Code of Practice. Pursuant to the Gaming Machines Operators 
Code of Practice, Tabcorp and Tattersalls agree to promote responsible 
gaming by providing, among other things, the ‘availability and promotion of 
self-exclusion procedures’. Concurrently, under the Licensed Venue 
Operators Code of Practice, venue operators undertake:  
… persons known by the venue operator to be participating in 
a self-exclusion program.  
• To assist patrons to whom gaming machine play presents problems 
by supporting a venue self-exclusion program, displaying signage 
and brochures promoting accredited counselling services and 
directing those patrons to avenues of effective support.  
The Victorian state government has attempted to implement policies and 
procedures to ensure that voluntary self-exclusion programs do not operate 
solely under the Codes, and that the programs operate in such a manner as to 
adequately achieve harm minimisation objectives. In December 2007, the 
state government enacted the Gambling Legislation Amendment (Problem 
Gambling and Other Measures) Act 2007 amending the Gambling Regulation 
Act 2003, through, inter alia, the introduction of a new provision, section 
3.4.12A. Pursuant to this provision, it is a condition of licensing that a gaming 
venue conducts a voluntary self-exclusion program that has been approved by 
the Commission. Pursuant to section 10.6.2 a gaming venue is required to 
comply with several conditions in order to successfully operate a voluntary 
self-exclusion program.58
                                                 
57 Crown Melbourne Limited Code of Practice and Responsible Gaming Support Centre; 
Tabcorp Responsible Gambling Code of Practice; Victorian Gaming Machine Industry 
Accord; Victorian Gaming Machine Industry Advertising Code of Ethics; Licensed Venue 
Operators Code of Practice; Gaming Machine Operators Code of Practice; Greyhound 
Racing Victoria Responsible Wagering Code of Practice; Harness Racing Victoria 
Responsible Wagering Code of Practice; Tattersall’s Responsible Gaming Code of Conduct 
and Tattersall’s Lottery Retailer Code of Practice. See, for a list of such codes: 
<
 
http://www.austgamingcouncil.org.au/images/pdf/Fact_Sheets/agc_fs22respgambling.pdf>.  
58 Gambling Legislation Amendment (Problem Gambling and Other Measures) Act 2007 (Vic), 
s 10.6.2.  
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In 2008, the Victorian Department of Justice published additional draft 
guidelines and standards for voluntary self-exclusion programs.59
a) require the venue operator to take reasonable steps to ensure that a 
self-excluded person does not enter the gaming machine area of the 
venue, and  
 These 
included a direction that a voluntary self-exclusion program must: 
b) detail the procedure that will be adopted to detect self-excluded 
persons who enter the gaming machine area of the venue.60
Typically, more prescriptive legislation applies to Casino operators than to 
other sorts of gaming venues. Such legislation generally has several common 
features. The first of these features is the requirement that the Casino operator 
conduct a formal self-exclusion program. Secondly, the Acts impose 
minimum requirements in respect of the operation of such programs. The 
provisions further stipulate that, in instances where a problem gambler is 
found to be in breach of a self-exclusion program, he or she can be liable to a 
penalty. It should be noted that legislation governing self-exclusions programs 
in a casino typically only applies to that casino. Therefore a problem gambler 
who enters into a self-exclusion program pursuant to such legislation will be 
excluded from only that casino. This type of arrangement may be contrasted 
with a Deed of Self Exclusion (discussed below) which permits the problem 
gambler to nominate several venues from which he or she wishes to be 
excluded.   
 
In Victoria, the Casino Control Act 1991 (Vic) (‘CCA 1991’) requires the 
casino to provide and manage a voluntary self-exclusion program.61
The Commission or a casino operator may give a written order under this 
section to a person, on the voluntary application of the person, prohibiting 
the person from entering or remaining in a casino.  
 Under 
section 72 of the CCA 1991: 
Under section 78, where the casino operator (including its employees) 
‘reasonably believes that a person the subject of an exclusion order under s 72 
is in the casino’ it must notify an inspector who must remove the person from 
the casino. There is no provision directly requiring the casino to have in place 
                                                 
59 Responsible Gambling Codes of Conduct, above n 8, 2–3.  
60 Ibid 19. 
61 Casino Control Act 1991 (Vic), ss 72–78A. See also Casino Control Act 1992 (NSW) ss 79–
84 and Casino Control Act 1982 (Qld) ss 91N–91P. 
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procedures for detecting excluded patrons.62
Through the security and surveillance systems operated within and around 
the licensed premises complex, the licensee will ensure, to the extent 
reasonably possible, that self barred customers are excluded from the 
complex. 
 By contrast, the Adelaide Casino 
Responsible Gambling Code of Practice made under the Casino Act 1997 
(SA) provides that:  
In Victoria, the consequences of a breach of a self-exclusion order by a 
problem gambler are governed by section 77 of the CCA 1991. The provision 
states that if a person, who is subject to an exclusion order, enters or remains 
in the casino he or she may be liable to a penalty of up to $2000. Under 
section 78B of the CCA 1991, the winnings of a person who is subject to an 
exclusion order are forfeited to the state. Whether such a fine provides much 
of a disincentive for problem gamblers to re-enter the venue may be 
questioned. It is suggested that problem gamblers are people who return to 
gaming venues despite making heavy losses when gambling. The risk of a 
penalty may be viewed by such gamblers as merely another risk, akin to a 
gamble, and for this reason the penalty may have little effect on their 
behaviour.  
IV THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SELF-EXCLUSION PROGRAMS 
There is little data on the effectiveness of gaming venues in removing or 
excluding gamblers who have entered into a voluntary self-exclusion 
program. Under the new guidelines proposed by the Victorian Department of 
Justice in 2008:  
A self-exclusion program must set out a process by which the venue 
operator will assess the operation and effectiveness of the program and must 
specify: 
(a) how often the self-exclusion program will be reviewed; 
(b) the criteria that will be used to assess the effectiveness of the self- 
      exclusion program; 
                                                 
62 Cf Adelaide Casino Responsible Gambling Code of Practice cl 6, made under the Casino Act 
1997 (SA) which provides that:  
Through the security and surveillance systems operated within and around the 
licensed premises complex, the licensee will ensure, to the extent reasonably 
possible, that self barred customers are excluded from the complex. 
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(c) how customers who have self-excluded and problem 
     gambling support services can have input into the review process; 
(d) who will be provided with a copy of the review findings.63
As yet, these guidelines have not resulted in the publication of any data on the 
effectiveness of self-exclusion programs.  
 
The South Australian Centre for Economic Studies (the ‘SACES’) in its 2003 
report titled Evaluation of Self-exclusion Programs and Harm Minimisation 
Measures: Report A suggests that there may be instances where the gaming 
venue has not actually implemented a consistent system for ensuring that self-
excluded gamblers can be detected, removed from the venue and/or precluded 
from further entering.64 Further, the SACES found that, even where a gaming 
venue may have a detecting system implemented to identify self-excluded 
patrons, such a system may be weak and problem gamblers are nevertheless 
circumventing them.65
The suggestion in the SACES report — that self-exclusion programs may be 
minimally effective — is supported by evidence derived from case law. The 
decision of Kakavas v Crown Ltd
 It appears that many gaming venues rely on a ‘facial 
recognition system’. Given the high number of patrons, whether such a 
system will actually identify problem gamblers on a regular basis is 
questionable. 
66 demonstrates an extreme example of 
disregard by a casino for the decision of a problem gambler to self-exclude. In 
this case the plaintiff alleged that, even though he applied for self-exclusion, 
the gaming venue ‘concocted a scheme to lure the plaintiff back to the 
Casino’.67 Indeed, the plaintiff alleged that ‘[i]nstructions were accordingly 
given to Crown employees “to do whatever was necessary to induce the 
plaintiff to return and recommence gambling.”’68
                                                 
63 Business Victoria, Government of Victoria, Gaming Venue Business Toolkit: Responsible 
Gambling, Chapter 14 (2008) 16. Also at <http://www.business.vic.gov.au 
/busvicwr/_assets/main/lib60180/sbv+toolkit+ch14.pdf>. 
 The measures adopted to 
ensure that the plaintiff would return and recommence gambling included 
approaches from employees of the Casino ‘who offered the plaintiff 
64 Evaluation of Self-exclusion Programs, above n 8, 19. 
65 Ibid. 
66 [2007] VSC 526 (8 December 2009).  
67 Ibid [16]. 
68 Ibid. 
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inducements, such as permission to bet up to $3 000 000 per hand, and a 20% 
rebate on losses’.69
Foroughi v Star City Pty Limited
 
70
I went back to the Casino to see whether the Exclusion Order would work 
and whether the Casino staff would stop me from going back into the 
premises. I was very scared that the Casino staff would catch me. But 
nobody noticed me and I was not caught so I returned a few more times.
 (‘Foroughi’) also illustrates the flaws 
inherent in some of the systems in place in gaming venues for detecting self-
excluded gamblers. The plaintiff, Mr Foroughi, gave evidence that within a 
few weeks of making a voluntary self-exclusion order:  
71
Between 11 June 2004 and 28 January 2006, Mr Foroughi entered the Star 
City, a casino in New South Wales, on 65 occasions, incurring losses ranging 
from $1000 to $73 000. Mr Foroughi continued to enter the casino even after 
initiating an action against the venue:  
 
On 23 November 2005, Ms Virginia Baker, who holds the position of 
Responsible Gambling Manager for Star City, sent a memo to the Casino's 
Security Managers and Surveillance Managers about Mr Foroughi's claims. 
She requested that Mr Foroughi's photograph be placed on a ‘persons of 
interest’ board, also known as the ‘hot list’, to assist staff to prevent him 
from entering the casino. 
In spite of the hot list posting, Mr Foroughi’s unchallenged evidence is that 
he entered the casino on 16 December 2005 and gambled large amount of 
money on the roulette tables. Indeed, so large was his betting that he claims 
he was offered the facilities of ‘the high rollers’’ room. He claims to have 
suffered losses totalling $100,000 on 16 December 2005 and 17 December 
2005.72
The defendant, Star City, gave evidence as to the number of exclusion orders 
issued: 
 
In 2003/2004, 490 exclusion orders were issued by Star City, of which 186 
were voluntary exclusion orders. In 2004/2005, Star City issued 504 
exclusion orders, of which 163 were voluntary exclusion orders. 
                                                 
69 Ibid. 
70 [2007] FCA 1503 (27 September 2007). 
71 Ibid [15]. 
72 Ibid [20]–[21]. 
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In 2004/2005, Star City had in place approximately 4,000 current exclusion 
orders, of which over 1,000 were voluntary exclusion orders.73
The process of exclusion involved facial recognition by staff: 
 
Surveillance operators are required to familiarise themselves with 
photographs of excluded patrons on the database. In addition, the Security 
Department maintains a register of excluded patrons, with approximately 
200 lever arch folders of documentation relating to excluded patrons.74
Star City further provided figures as to its success in detecting excluded 
patrons as follows:
 
75
Year 
  
Number of self-excluded patrons detected Number of occasions 
2002/2003 245 305 
2003/2004 206 247 
2004/2005 202 246 
 
Star City accepted that ‘it was possible for excluded patrons to re-enter the 
casino’ because memorising every excluded person’s face was not possible.76
By contrast, overseas experience indicates that the use of a smart card 
technology system is possibly the most efficient mechanism for the 
identification of self-excluded patrons.
 
It may be suggested that the proportion of excluded patrons who attempt to re-
enter the casino, or the success of Star City in detecting them, is difficult to 
assess without knowing the total number of valid voluntary self-exclusion 
orders in effect. Nevertheless, the number of self-excluded patrons detected 
entering the casino in 2003/4 and 2004/5 was higher than the number of 
orders issued in those years.  
77
                                                 
73 Ibid [61]–[62]. 
  
74 Ibid [66]. 
75 Ibid [68]. 
76 Ibid [69]. 
77 Evaluation of Self-exclusion Programs, above n 8, 19. 
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A Smart Card System 
A smart card is a plastic card that is similar to the standard bank or credit 
card. It is capable of storing data relevant to the person to whom the card has 
been issued. By containing an embedded microprocessor, the card ensures that 
only an authorised card reader is capable of reading the data stored on the 
card.78
Such cards may be used in a beneficial manner in the context of exclusion 
orders, as they identify gambling patrons via a photograph or a stored digital 
image. The advantage of including an identifying image is that it may be 
displayed electronically when a patron is using an EGM. This would facilitate 
the conducting of passive checks by the gaming venue in order to ensure that 
patrons who are using EGMs are using their personal card, and, more 
importantly, that they are permitted to access the gaming area. Alternatively, 
gaming patrons could be required to either swipe their card or insert it into a 
machine before being granted access to a gaming area. This would provide a 
method by which gaming venues could successfully prevent excluded patrons 
from entering gaming areas. For example, in the Netherlands, personal 
identification of individuals is required before they can enter any one of the 
twelve casinos. A computer is able to immediately identify self-excluded 
patrons, and a computerised monitoring system across venues facilitates the 
identification of a self-excluded patron who is trying to enter more than one 
gambling venue.
 This means that, although personal sensitive information may be 
stored on the card, that information is protected.  
79
Further, a smart card can be programmed to identify problem gamblers. The 
card has the ability to store data, including patterns of gaming activity. Such 
data, coupled with expert research, has the potential to identify problem 
gamblers. Where appropriate, such gamblers may be temporarily suspended to 
prevent further gambling harm.  
 
The introduction of a smart card system into gaming venues would not require 
much development. For example, in Victoria, all three major gaming 
corporations have various forms of card-based loyalty programs.80
                                                 
78 See HowStuffWorks Inc, What is a “smart card”? (1 April 2000) HowStuffWorks.com 
<http://computer.howstuffworks.com/question332.htm>. 
 When 
visiting a gaming venue, patrons can insert their card into a card reader for the 
79 Evaluation of Self-exclusion Programs, above n 8 20.  
80 The loyalty programs include: Tabaret Rewards, Tatts Pokies Advantage and Crown Club. 
See Gambler's Help Southern, ‘Smart Cards: The Overdue Magic Bullet?’ (GM Newsletter, 
No 4(8), Gambler’s Help Southern, February 2006) 1. 
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purpose of receiving reward points. Gaming patrons may then exchange these 
reward points for benefits such as food and drink. The current loyalty program 
is, however, flawed as a control mechanism primarily because is an opt-in 
program rather than making patron-identification a prerequisite for entering a 
gaming venue. Further, a gaming patron must currently possess separate 
loyalty cards for each venue, rather than a single card. Nevertheless, the 
operation of these loyalty programs does not differ significantly from the 
operation of a smart card system.  
In this context, it is worth noting that in 2005, South Australia’s Independent 
Gambling Authority (SAIGA) conducted extensive research into smart card 
technology.81 SAIGA published a report that, although it did not call for a 
mandatory smart card system, made recommendations that a system be 
implemented that allows for: (a) playtime to be systematically tracked; (b) 
players to set limits on their play; and (c) players to be excluded either 
voluntarily, or by the gaming venue, or under relevant family law 
provisions.82
V LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF A GAMING VENUE THAT 
FAILS TO DETECT AND EXCLUDE A PROBLEM 
GAMBLER 
  
According to the website of the Australian Hotels Association: 
Self-exclusion is an entirely voluntary process. It is an agreement the 
individual makes with themselves, for themselves. It involves no other 
person in any responsibilities - legal or otherwise.83
It is suggested that there is some legal responsibility imposed on a gaming 
venue that conducts a voluntary self-exclusion program. However, the 
opportunities for legal redress for a problem gambler who has entered into a 
voluntary self-exclusion program and has failed to be excluded by the gaming 
venue in question are limited.  
 
                                                 
81 Independent Gambling Authority (SA), Inquiry into Smartcard Technology (Report, 
Independent Gambling Authority, 2005) <http://www.iga.sa.gov.au/pubcons/ 
smartcrd/SCTInqRep-final-web.pdf>. 
82 Ibid 42.  
83 Self-exclusion, above n 9. 
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A Breach of Statutory Duty 
As noted above, certain legislation regulating the gaming industry imposes an 
obligation on the gaming venue to facilitate a voluntary self-exclusion 
program. Where a gaming venue fails to effectively exclude a gambler, the 
possibility of an action for breach of statutory duty arises. The imposition of 
liability for breach of statutory duty is dependent on whether the legislation 
which imposes an obligation for the protection or benefit of a particular 
class of persons is, upon its proper construction, intended to provide a 
ground of civil liability when the breach of the obligation causes injury or 
damage of a kind against which the statute was designed to afford 
protection.84
Courts have generally been unwilling to recognise a claim for a breach of 
statutory duty in the context of the gaming industry in favour of the problem 
gambler. In Reynolds v Katoomba RSL All Services Club Ltd
  
85 (‘Reynolds’) 
the plaintiff’s claim for breach of statutory duty arising from the Registered 
Club Act 1976 (NSW) was dismissed at first instance on the basis that the Act 
did not expressly endow the plaintiff with a private right of action, nor was 
there a legislative intention to confer such a right.86
In Preston v Star City Pty Ltd
  
87 (‘Preston’) the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, a 
breach of statutory duty by the Casino when it allowed him to gamble whilst 
intoxicated. According to the plaintiff, in doing so, the defendant Casino 
breached section 163 of the Casino Control Act 1992 (NSW), which prohibits 
intoxicated people from gambling at a casino. In an action by the Casino to 
strike out the plaintiff’s statement of claim, Wood CJ found that, in the 
context of the comprehensive regulatory scheme enacted by the Casino 
Control Act 1992 (NSW), which includes disciplinary actions in the event of 
contraventions of the regulations, the legislative intention required to facilitate 
private rights of action for damages was lacking.88
                                                 
84 Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410, 424 (Brennan CJ and Dawson and 
Toohey JJ).  
 Wood CJ also held that: 
85 [2001] NSWCA 234 (20 September 2001). 
86 Ibid (Spigelman CJ, Powell and Giles JJA).  
87 [1999] NSWSC 1273 (1 February 2000). 
88 Ibid [87]. 
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There is nothing in [the Street Report or the Second Reading Speech], or in 
the Act itself, to suggest that there should be a private right of action 
additional to the obligations imposed upon casino operators.89
The claim for breach of statutory duty was struck out for the reason that it 
would not be supported in law. 
 
In Foroughi90
In any event, the legislative history and the case law indicate that the 
intention of the Casino Control Act was not to confer a private right of 
action for damages on problem gamblers who may enter a casino in breach 
of an exclusion order.
 the claim for breach of statutory duty under section 85 of the 
Casino Control Act 1992 (NSW) was not argued at the hearing. Jacobson J 
also held: 
91
B Contract 
 
Typically, a gambler entering into a voluntary self-exclusion program will 
sign some form of document recording the arrangement. The document may 
vary between venues. One form of voluntary self-exclusion document is a 
‘Deed of Self-exclusion’ (‘Deed’) found on the ‘Australian Hotels 
Association/Licensed Clubs Association of Victoria’ website.92 The Deed 
states that it is to be executed as a deed poll, that is, an obligation imposed on 
one party only. The Deed provides that the problem gambler undertakes not to 
enter the gaming area of designated gaming venues, and not to use gaming 
machines at the nominated venues.93 In addition, the problem gambler 
undertakes to seek, and continue to seek, the assistance and advice of a 
problem gambling counsellor.94 The problem gambler authorises management 
of a nominated venue to take ‘all actions as deemed necessary by us 
(including the use of reasonable force) to have you removed and prevent you 
from further access’.95
                                                 
89 Ibid.  
 The problem gambler generally nominates a period of 
exclusion, which may be somewhere between a minimum of six months and a 
90 [2007] FCA 1503 (27 September 2007). 
91 Ibid [95] (Jacobson J).  
92 For an example of a Deed of Self-exclusion see Australia Hotels Association, SEGO Sample 
Deed, (2008) Australia Hotels Association < http://www.ahavic.com.au/deed/index.html>. 
93 Ibid cl 2. 
94 Ibid cl 8. 
95 Ibid cl 3.  
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maximum of two years.96 A breach of a Deed raises no express liability for 
either the problem gambler or the gaming venue. The document is drafted to 
ensure that no obligation is placed on the gaming venue. It expressly provides 
‘I understand that Self-exclusion from Restricted Gaming Areas at the 
Venue/s is made voluntarily and does not place any obligation, duty or 
responsibility on anyone except myself’.97
In the absence of any obligation on the gaming venue, the Deed cannot 
operate as a contract. If the document did contain mutual undertakings, it 
might be argued to operate as a contract. Nevertheless, it appears that there 
may be attempts by the gaming venue to limit its liability for breach of 
contract or indeed other causes of action. For example, the Deed cited above, 
contains an indemnity clause (cl 17) stating that the gaming venue is to be 
exempt from all  
  
actions, liabilities, proceedings, losses, claims, damages, costs and expenses 
which the Indemnified Persons may suffer, incur, or sustain in connection 
with or arising directly or indirectly from any act, default or omission.  
However, it is suggested that the mere inclusion of a ‘reverse indemnity’ 
clause may not exempt the gaming venue from potential liabilities. The clause 
may be void as illusory. If the core undertaking of the gaming corporation is 
to prevent the problem gambler from remaining on the premises it is difficult 
to see how a clause that excludes all responsibility leaves any content to the 
core obligation. Further, it has been held that, in circumstances where a 
‘reverse indemnity’ attempts to defeat the effect of a statutory right, such as 
that found under section 52 of the TPA, it is unlikely to be effective.98
If the Deed used by a gaming venue did in fact operate as a contract, then a 
failure to exclude a patron who has entered into such a contract would be 
evidence of a breach on the part of the gaming venue. However, the problem 
gambler would also be in breach of the contract. This raises the question of 
whether the wrongdoing on the part of the problem gambler precludes him or 
her from an action for breach of contract. In Foroughi the voluntary self-
exclusion order was made on a form of application signed by the gambler and 
witnessed by an employee of Star City. The gambler stated in the application 
that ‘he recognised that it was his responsibility not to enter the gaming areas 
  
                                                 
96 Ibid cl 7.  
97 Ibid.  
98 See Petera Pty Ltd v EAJ Pty Ltd (1984) 7 FCR 375; Byers v Dorotea Pty Ltd (1986) 69 
ALR 715, 725; Clark Equipment Australia Ltd v Covoat Pty Ltd (1987) 71 ALR 367.  
2010 SELF-EXCLUSION PROGRAMS FOR PROBLEM GAMBLERS 191 
and he undertook not to do so’. He also undertook to seek assistance and 
advice from a qualified counsellor in problem gaming.99
Mr Foroughi breached the terms of his undertakings set out in the 
application for an exclusion order. Even if there were a term of the contract 
under which Star City agreed to take reasonable steps to apprehend and 
remove Mr Foroughi, I do not consider that Star City was in breach of it. 
 Jacobson J held that: 
Any loss suffered by Mr Foroughi was caused, not by Star City, but by Mr 
Foroughi's deliberate and voluntary conduct in entering the casino and 
gambling in breach of his written undertakings.100
This conclusion may be questioned. The deed was entered into for the reason 
that the problem-gambler lacked self-control in respect to gambling and 
therefore needed the assistance of the gaming venue to help control the 
problem.
 
101 If the gaming venue is to be absolved from any liability — in 
particular in circumstances where a problem gambler engages in behaviour for 
which it has sought assistance — then the self-exclusion agreement is 
rendered ineffective. A problem gambler who enters into such a program has 
taken steps to address his or her difficulty with gambling. However, the self-
exclusion program may not be enough to curtail the addiction. Such a person 
is ‘under a disability’102
C Negligence 
 and may therefore be unable to ensure that he or she 
does not re-enter the gaming venue in question. Arguably, in entering such a 
program, the problem gambler assumes that the gaming venue will do 
everything reasonably within its power, as promised. If a gaming venue is not 
to be held liable after it has entered into such programs, there appears to be no 
incentive for the gaming venue to ensure that such programs are governed 
effectively.  
Courts have generally held that a gaming venue does not owe a duty of care to 
a person in circumstances where it knew, or ought to have known, that the 
person was a problem gambler to protect that person against financial loss 
from gambling.103
                                                 
99 Foroughi [2007] FCA 1503 (27 September 2007), [3]. 
 In Reynolds, the plaintiff Mr Reynolds first became 
100 Ibid [143]–[144]. 
101 Evaluation of Self-exclusion Programs, above n 8, 47.  
102 Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Ltd [2009] VSC 559 (8 December 2009), [440]–[444].  
103 Reynolds [2001] NSWCA 234 (20 September 2001) (Spigelman CJ, Powell and Giles JJA); 
Foroughi [2007] FCA 1503 (27 September 2007); Politarhis v Westpac Banking Corporation 
[2008] SASC 296 (31 October 2008). 
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familiar with poker machines, and other forms of gambling in 1984 at the age 
of 19, when he commenced employment at the Katoomba Golf Club. By 
1991, he was going to the Club to gamble every day. At first, he would lose 
around $100, but his losses became progressively higher.104
In my opinion the law should not recognise a duty of care to protect persons 
from economic loss, where the loss only occurs following a deliberate and 
voluntary act on the part of the person to be protected. There may be, 
however, an extraordinary case where a duty should be recognised. The 
present case is not such.
 By 1994, he had 
gambled away in excess of $250 000. The Club was aware that Mr Reynolds 
had a problem with gambling but continued to facilitate his gambling 
addiction by cashing his personal, business and third party cheques, despite 
being asked by both Mr Reynolds and his family to desist from doing so. For 
such reasons, Mr Reynolds argued that the Club breached its duty of care to 
him and acted unconscionably in its dealings with him. At first instance, the 
trial judge held that, although Mr Reynolds was a ‘compulsive gambler’ and 
the Club was aware of this, the act of gambling was, in the end, a question of 
Mr Reynolds’ free will. Mr Reynolds then appealed to the New South Wales 
Court of Appeal where Spigelman CJ stated: 
105
Chief Justice Spigelman emphasised that mechanisms other than reliance on 
the gaming venue were available to the plaintiff to control his gambling:  
 
It may well be that the Appellant found it difficult, even impossible, to 
control his urge to continue gambling beyond the point of prudence. 
However, there was nothing which prevented him staying away from the 
club. The suggested duty on the club to advise him to resign his 
membership emphasises the point. He could have resigned at any time. The 
requests to refuse to cash cheques when asked, did not shift his personal 
responsibility for his own actions to the club. There was no reason for the 
club to honour one request rather than the other.106
This approach was followed in Foroughi, where Jacobson J stated that the 
responsibility to control the plaintiff’s gambling lay with the plaintiff not the 
casino.
 
107
                                                 
104 Reynolds [2001] NSWCA 234 (20 September 2001), [58].  
  
105 Ibid [17], [27]. 
106 Ibid [48]. 
107 Foroughi [2007] FCA 1503 (27 September 2007), [128]. 
2010 SELF-EXCLUSION PROGRAMS FOR PROBLEM GAMBLERS 193 
It may be argued that the approach indicated in these cases should not apply in 
cases where a problem gambler has entered into a voluntary self-exclusion 
agreement. Here, the circumstances differ from the normal case of a problem 
gambler. Where a gambler has entered into a voluntary self-exclusion 
program, the individual has taken some responsibility for his or her problem 
gambling by seeking to be banned from the gaming venue. The gaming venue 
has also accepted some element of responsibility through its operation of the 
program. However, even if a gaming venue prima facie owes a duty of care to 
a gambler who has entered into a voluntary self-exclusion program, the mere 
entry of the gambler into the venue will not necessarily breach that duty. The 
duty is one of reasonable care. The gambler would need to show something 
more, such as a failure by the gaming venue to put in place a reasonable 
program or a lack of reasonable care in implementing that program.  
In Preston v Star City Pty Ltd (No 3),108 (‘Preston No (3)’) Hoeben J allowed 
a claim in negligence, and a claim for a breach of statutory duty, to continue 
to trial because the allegations went beyond those made in Reynolds. The case 
concerned the plaintiff, Preston, who alleged that he suffered losses of 
approximately $3 million as a result of gambling at Star City, a casino in New 
South Wales.109
On appeal at first instance, Wood CJ held that, on the facts, a duty of care 
may not ‘go so far as preventing the offer of a limited or reasonable range of 
inducements and complimentary services’.
 Preston argued that Star City was aware of his problem with 
gambling and that it proactively encouraged the gambling by enticing him 
with promises that ‘if he remained a high roller patron it would make 
available various business contracts related to its procurement needs or 
promotions’. Further, Preston alleged that Star City took advantage of his 
gambling weakness by providing a cheque-cashing facility and certain 
benefits, including free alcohol.  
110
the provision of significant credit facilities or excessive encouragement 
through incentives, of a person who has specifically asked to be barred or to 
go beyond a limit that he has asked the casino to set.
 Notwithstanding this, his 
Honour further held that a duty of care may exist to discourage  
111
In permitting the claim for negligence, Wood CJ held that the Court should be 
‘astute not to risk stifling the development of the law’.
  
112
                                                 
108 [2005] NSWSC 1223 (5 December 2005) (‘Preston No (3)’). 
 Further, his Honour 
109 Preston v Star City Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 459 (18 May 1999) [3]. 
110 Preston v Star City Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 1273 (1 February 2000) [132].  
111 Ibid [133]. 
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held that the developing nature of the tort of negligence, and ‘the incremental 
approach ... make it inappropriate to [strike out the common law count] ... 
merely because no category of case of this kind has been recognised in this 
country’.113 On a further application hearing, Hoeben J held that a duty of care 
might be breached so as to give rise to a cause of action in negligence, where 
the defendant operator of a gambling establishment, knowing that a patron 
was a ‘problem gambler’, carelessly failed to ensure that its employees did not 
exploit that patron’s weakness.114
By contrast, in Foroughi,
  
115 Jacobson J considered that the casino’s use of 
only a facial recognition system for identifying self-excluded gamblers was 
not a breach of any duty of care by the casino to such gamblers. In 
Foroughi116 the plaintiff, Mr Foroughi, who described himself as both a 
‘problem gambler’ and ‘pathological gambler’, applied for a voluntary 
exclusion order pursuant to section 79(3) of the Casino Control Act 1992 
(NSW), after having suffered substantial gambling losses. Star City, the 
defendant, made such an order against Mr Foroughi on 18 May 2004. 
Notwithstanding the operation of the exclusion order, Mr Foroughi alleged 
that he entered Star City’s casino on 65 occasions and as a result, suffered 
gambling losses amounting to many hundred of thousands of dollars.117 Mr 
Foroughi therefore sought to recover those losses from Star City, asserting 
that the defendant owed him a duty of care to, inter alia, ‘take reasonable steps 
to prevent him from entering the gaming areas of the casino and/or to remove 
him from the casino’.118 In addition, Mr Foroughi sought to sue for damages 
pursuant to sections 52 and 92 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) because 
of representations that were made by an employee of Star City. The 
representations made to Mr Foroughi were to the effect that (a) Star City had 
approximately 5000 surveillance cameras which could be used to detect Mr 
Foroughi if he were to enter Star City and that (b) as soon as Star City became 
aware of Mr Foroughi’s presence in the casino, Star City would remove him 
from the premises.119
                                                                                                                    
112 Preston v Star City Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 459 (18 May 1999), [42].  
     
113 Preston v Star City Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 1273 (1 February 2000) [118].  
114 Preston (No 3) [2005] NSWSC 1223 (5 December 2005), [55]. See also Kakavas v Crown 
Ltd [2007] VSC 526 (8 December 2009), [46] (Harper J). 
115 [2007] FCA 1503 (27 September 2007). 
116 Ibid.  
117 Ibid [4]. 
118 Ibid [6].  
119 Ibid [7].  
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In considering Mr Foroughi’s claims, Jacobson J held that the possibility that 
the casino might use more sophisticated technology to detect excluded patrons 
was a matter for the regulatory authority, not the courts.120 It appears that 
most venues use facial recognition schemes as a means of identifying problem 
gamblers excluded from the venue. For example, as discussed earlier, in Star 
City, surveillance operators are asked to familiarise themselves with 
photographs of excluded patrons, recognise them on surveillance tapes and 
consequently to remove them from the premises.121 As Jacobson J held, ‘some 
staff are particularly good at recognising and detecting excluded patrons 
whereas others are not as good at this task’.122
On the basis of industry practice, it would appear that merely relying on such 
schemes does not breach any duty of care owed by a venue to a self-excluded 
patron. However, it also appears that these systems, at the very best, work 
only poorly. It might accordingly be argued that the standard of reasonable 
care should require more from venues. For example, the standard could be to 
require the gaming venue to use the smart card technology system, as 
discussed above.  
  
D Misleading and Deceptive Conduct 
Conduct that is misleading and deceptive is prohibited under the TPA, as well 
as by state and territory legislation.123 There are a number of possible ways in 
which a claim of misleading and deceptive conduct may be raised against a 
gaming venue in relation to a voluntary self-exclusion program. One possible 
claim may arise if the employees of a gaming venue, or the documentation 
associated with the voluntary self-exclusion program, exaggerate the 
effectiveness of the gaming venue in detecting and removing excluded 
patrons. As discussed, in Foroughi124 the plaintiff entered into a voluntary 
self-exclusion agreement with the defendant, Star City, and then proceeded to 
enter the defendant casino, suffering gambling losses to the amount of 
hundreds of thousands of dollars.125
                                                 
120 Ibid [138]. 
 Foroughi alleged that representations 
were made to him by an employee of Star City in relation to the effectiveness 
121 Ibid [44], [69].  
122 Ibid [64].  
123 See eg, Fair Trading Act 1999 (Vic); Fair Trading Act 1992 (ACT); Fair Trading Act 1989 
(Qld); Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW).  
124 [2007] FCA 1503 (27 September 2007).  
125 Ibid [4].  
196 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 15 NO 2 
of the voluntary self-exclusion agreement. These representations were to the 
effect that:  
Star City had 5,000 surveillance cameras in the casino which would be able 
to detect Mr Foroughi if he entered the gaming areas; and as soon as 
practicable after it became known to Star City … Star City would remove 
him from the premises.126
The representations also included the statement that ‘[w]e have got a system 
that no-one can escape from the system, so even if you come, we will catch 
you’.
 
127
The trial judge rejected the plaintiff's evidence, holding that the statements in 
question were not made. This finding was largely based on the view that an 
employee would not have made inaccurate statements.
  
128
An appeal by the plaintiff was dismissed
 It is suggested, 
however, that a plaintiff is equally unlikely to have imagined a statement 
given in this detail in the absence of a representation made by a member of 
staff.  
129 on the basis that, even if the 
alleged statements had been made,130 the plaintiff placed no reliance on any 
representation he claimed had been made to him.131
Jacobson J held that, had the statement been made and relied on, there would 
have been no reasonable grounds upon which the statement could be made, as 
 This approach negates 
entirely the role of any representations made by the gaming venue. If the only 
way the plaintiff could show reliance on the representations were by not 
returning to the venue, then the veracity of those representations could never 
be tested. Another explanation given by the court was that the plaintiff’s very 
problem was his inability to control his urges to gamble. The plaintiff 
accordingly entered into a voluntary self-exclusion program to assist him in 
controlling his compulsion. On the basis of the representations by the gaming 
venue’s employees, the plaintiff expected to be excluded, should he be 
compelled to return. The plaintiff therefore did not take further steps to 
control his gambling compulsion.  
                                                 
126 Ibid [7].  
127 Ibid [32]. 
128 Ibid [87]–[90].  
129 Ibid [150].  
130 Ibid [85]–[86].  
131 Ibid [85]. 
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Star City was unable to adequately identify the plaintiff if he entered the 
casino: 
Star City's evidence of the systems it had in place to detect excluded patrons 
and its evidence of the size of the casino and volume of patronage, shows 
that there was no guarantee that excluded patrons would be detected. Mr 
Clark accepted that this was so.132
Jacobson J further held that the casino had no
 
133 reasonable grounds for 
making statements to the effect that Star City would remove the plaintiff from 
the casino as soon as practicable after it knew that he was present.134
E Unconscionable Conduct 
 Thus, it 
appears that Jacobson J recognised the inadequacies of the system in place at 
the gaming venue. In these circumstances, it might be argued that the very act 
of promoting the existence of a self-exclusion program was misleading. 
A problem gambler who has entered into a voluntary self-exclusion program 
which has proved to be ineffective might be able to claim that the gaming 
venue has engaged in unconscionable conduct contrary to the provisions of 
the TPA and other state based legislation.135
A corporation shall not, in trade or commerce, in connection with the supply 
or possible supply of goods or services to a person, engage in conduct that 
is, in all the circumstances, unconscionable.  
 Part IVA of the TPA deals with 
unconscionable conduct in trade or commerce, and under section 51AB: 
The limitation of the prohibition in section 51AB to consumer transactions is 
effected by sub-sections (5) and (6). Sub-section (5) states that ‘goods or 
services’ refers to ‘goods or services of a kind ordinarily acquired for 
personal, domestic, or household use or consumption’. Gambling services 
would fall within this definition.  
In considering whether conduct is unconscionable under the TPA, courts may 
have regard to decisions on unconscionable dealing in equity. In particular, in 
                                                 
132 Ibid [88]. 
133 Ibid [87]–[90].  
134 Ibid [90]. 
135 See Fair Trading Act 1999 (Vic); Fair Trading Act 1992 (ACT); Fair Trading Act 1989 
(Qld); Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW). 
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the landmark case of Commercial Bank of Australia v Amadio,136
1. a party to a transaction was under a special disability in dealing 
with the other party with the consequence that there was an 
absence of any reasonable degree of equality between them; and 
 Deane J 
held that the doctrine applied where:  
2. the disability was sufficiently evident to the stronger party to make 
it prima facie unfair or ‘unconscientious’ that he procure, or 
accept, the weaker party’s assent to the impugned transaction in 
the circumstances in which he procured or accepted it.  
3. Where such circumstances are shown to have existed, an onus is 
cast upon the stronger party to show that the transaction was fair, 
just and reasonable.137
1 Special Disability  
 
The circumstances which will give rise to a special disability are not defined 
at common law and the categories are not closed. Fullagar J’s statement in 
Blomley v Ryan138
[P]overty, or need of any kind, sickness, age, sex, infirmity of body or 
mind, drunkenness, illiteracy, or lack of education, lack of assistance or 
explanation where assistance or explanation is necessary. The common 
characteristic seems to be that they have the effect of placing one party at a 
serious disadvantage vis-à-vis the other.
 provides insight into the types of circumstances which may 
be relevant for the purposes of establishing a special disability:  
139
A problem gambler might be described as acting under a special disability in 
relation to the gaming venue. As previously discussed, a ‘problem gambler’ is 
someone who begins to exhibit frequent, uncontrolled gambling behaviour 
which leads to subsequent harm.
  
140
In the decision of Paradise Enterprises Inc v Kakavas
 
141
                                                 
136 (1983) 151 CLR 447 (‘Amadio’).  
 Harper J accepted 
that in circumstances where a person is a pathological gambler he or she ‘may 
have an ... an impaired ability to control the frequency of gambling and the 
137 Ibid 474.  
138 (1956) 99 CLR 362.  
139 Ibid 405.  
140 Geoffrey T Caldwell et al, above n 17, 36. 
141 [2010] VSC 25 (16 February 2010). 
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amount of money wagered. That is to say ... the condition is capable of 
characterisation as a special disability for the purposes of the doctrine of 
unconscionable dealing.’142
In Foroughi
  
143 the plaintiff called evidence from a clinical psychologist who 
concluded that Foroughi satisfied the criteria stipulated in the DSM IV for a 
‘pathological’ gambler.144
Over time, pathological gamblers suffer from long lasting structural changes 
to the brain with reduced capacity to make rational decisions to cease 
gambling.  
 The psychologist further stated that neuro-scientific 
evidence indicates that: 
Expert evidence for the respondent maintained that Foroughi, despite 
demonstrating five of the ten criteria set out by the DSM IV, could only be 
labelled as a ‘problem gambler’. Jacobson J accepted this evidence and 
concluded in his judgment that the plaintiff was a problem and not 
pathological gambler. His Honour concluded that the plaintiff was not 
suffering under any special disability.145
Notwithstanding the distinction made by Jacobson J in Foroughi, it is 
proposed that the fact that an individual is a problem gambler should be 
sufficient for the purpose of establishing a ‘special disability’. As discussed 
previously, the term ‘pathological gambler’ is not necessarily reflective of the 
Australian approach to considering the difficult issues stemming from EGM 
gambling. In Preston
  
146 Wood CJ adopted a ‘problem gaming’ classification. 
The case involved the plaintiff, Preston, bringing several causes of action, 
including one for unconscionable conduct, against Star City Pty Ltd. Preston 
alleged, inter alia, that Star City was aware of his problem with gambling and 
induced him to take part in gaming in the casinos by assuring him that ‘if he 
remained a high roller patron it would make available various business 
contracts related to its procurement needs or promotions’.147 The plaintiff 
claimed that he was the weaker party as he was a ‘problem gambler’ with an 
addiction to that activity.148
                                                 
142 Ibid [12] (Harper J).  
 In rejecting an action to strike out the claim by the 
Casino, Wood CJ held that the plaintiff’s position as a problem gambler 
143 [2007] FCA 1503 (27 September 2007).  
144 Ibid [105].  
145 Ibid [140]. 
146 [1999] NSWSC 1273 (1 February 2000). 
147 Ibid [13]. 
148 Ibid [177].  
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‘could be equated to that of a person with a mental weakness, which was there 
for the exploitation’.149
Similarly, in the case of American Express International v Simon 
Famularo,
  
150 Naughton J held that a person who is a pathological or problem 
gambler has a special disability. The case concerned the plaintiff, Famularo, 
bringing a claim of unconscionable conduct against a hotel whose staff made 
representations to Famularo that he could get a cash advance against his credit 
card so that he could gamble at the hotel. This induced the plaintiff to stay and 
gamble on the premises.151 Consequently, Naughton J held that the hotel’s 
conduct of taking advantage of Famularo was unconscionable and the 
pertinent ‘special disadvantage’ was the plaintiff’s pathological gambling in 
conjunction with his inability to know that the cash advances that the hotel 
allowed for were illegal and breached the Liquor Act 1982 as well as the 
merchant agreement between Amex and the hotel.152 Further, the Court held 
that, had Famularo been informed by the hotel staff, that he could not obtain 
cash advances, he would have accepted this fact and his transactions with 
American Express would not have occurred. Naughton J said, ‘the ease with 
which the defendant was permitted by the hotel to get cash advances from it 
against his American Express card increased the frequency of the defendant’s 
gambling and the amounts of money which he used for it. I find that the said 
misrepresentations were untrue and amounted to misleading conduct.’153 For 
such reasons, the Court held that the hotel’s conduct in misrepresenting to the 
defendant that he could obtain cash advances, and in fact making those 
advances, was ‘in all the circumstances of this case unconscionable within the 
meaning of s 51AB of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)’.154
2 Knowledge of the Disability 
 
The second element of the doctrine of unconscionable conduct is that: 
the disability was sufficiently evident to the stronger party to make it prima 
facie unfair or ‘unconscientious’ that he procure, or accept, the weaker 
                                                 
149 Ibid [178].  
150 (Unreported, Limited District Court of NSW, Naughton DCJ, 19 February 2001). 
151 Ibid 21.  
152 Ibid.  
153 Ibid.  
154 Ibid 41.  
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party’s assent to the impugned transaction in the circumstances in which he 
procured or accepted it.155
This requirement may be referred to as one of knowledge. It is only when the 
stronger party proceeds with the transaction in light of the knowledge of the 
weaker party’s special disability that the victimisation of the weaker party 
occurs.
 
156
In cases concerning a problem gambler, the knowledge requirement may be 
satisfied in several ways. As discussed above, gaming corporations possess 
information capable of identifying a ‘very small group of customers’ who are 
responsible for 57 per cent of the corporation’s revenue. This information is 
obtained through data collection via respective loyalty membership schemes 
and is primarily used by gaming corporations for marketing purposes. It is 
suggested that if the venues in question are capable of targeting their 
marketing initiatives at heavy users in an attempt to entice them to remain at 
the machines longer
 There are several ways in which the stronger party may satisfy this 
element. Most obviously, the element would be satisfied through the actual 
knowledge of the weaker party’s special disability. However, in the case of 
Amadio, Deane and Mason JJ held that ‘wilful ignorance is not to be 
distinguished in its equitable consequences from knowledge’. Thus, wilful 
ignorance (where the stronger does not turn his or her mind to the weaker 
party’s vulnerability) is also sufficient for the purpose of making out the 
knowledge element. It should also be noted that in the case of Amadio no 
‘actual knowledge’ was possessed by the defendants. The majority did, 
however, make a statement that the special disability of the Amadios would 
have been evident to any reasonable person. Thus, it may be inferred that, in 
circumstances where the plaintiff cannot necessarily make out either actual 
knowledge or wilful blindness, the courts may consider whether the special 
disability in question would have been evident to any reasonable person.  
157 they are clearly in possession of particular information 
that allows them to view which individuals fall within the ‘heavy’ losing 
limits. As the loyalty cards are issued to individuals with a unique 
identification code, it is submitted that the determination of a person’s 
gambling habits should not be very difficult.158
                                                 
155 Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447, 474.  
 Thus, although the gambling 
corporation is under no obligation to cease providing gambling services to the 
problem gambler, where such a card has been issued it cannot maintain that it 
156 Hart v O’Connor [1985] AC 1000, 1028. See also Anthony J Duggan, ‘Unconscientious 
Dealing’ in Patrick Parkinson (ed), The Principles of Equity (Lawbook, 2nd ed, 2003) 147.  
157 Doughney, above n 35, 42.  
158 Verity Edwards, ‘Pokie Loyalty Card “has limits”’, The Australian (Sydney), 24 July 2008, 
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has no knowledge of the individual’s ‘special disability’. Moreover, it may be 
argued that, where a corporation makes no further inquiries into a ‘heavy 
user’s’ gambling circumstances, the corporation renders itself wilfully blind to 
the individual situation.  
In instances where the problem gambler has entered into a voluntary self-
exclusion agreement, the knowledge requirement is even more easily 
satisfied.159
3 Rebutting the Presumption  
 In such cases the gambling venue will possess actual knowledge 
of the individual problem gambler’s special disability.   
Once it is established that a person is under a special disability, and that the 
stronger party has, knowing of that disability, continued to deal with the 
weaker party, the stronger party has the burden of proving that the transaction 
is fair. There is therefore, in effect, a rebuttable presumption that the 
transaction is unfair. In circumstances where a problem gambler has entered 
into an exclusion program, and the gaming venue has made reasonable efforts 
to exclude that person, it might be argued by the gaming venue that it has not 
in any way taken advantage of the problem gambler. Even where the gambler 
has entered the venue in breach of the agreement, provided the venue has 
reasonable measures in place to attempt to identify excluded patrons, the 
venue may argue that it has acted properly. In Foroughi Jacobson J held that 
the casino had not taken advantage of the plaintiff for the purposes of 
unconscionable conduct, effectively on the ground that the exclusion order 
against the plaintiff was properly made and managed.160
A claim of unconscionable dealing might be made out where a gaming venue 
has, notwithstanding its knowledge of a person’s gambling problems, offered 
inducements to that person to gamble. In Preston Wood CJ refused to strike 
out as untenable the plaintiff’s claim that the casino took advantage of the 
plaintiff’s vulnerability as a problem gambler by offering him inducements to 
gamble, and by offering free alcohol, even when he was already 
intoxicated.
 A different result 
might be reached where the system used by the gaming venue to monitor 
problem gamblers is inadequate. 
161
                                                 
159 Evaluation of Self-exclusion Programs, above n 8. 
 In Kakavas Harper J rejected the gaming venue’s action to 
strike out a claim of unconscionable dealing where the plaintiff had been 
160 Foroughi [2007] FCA 1503 (27 September 2007), [140]. 
161 See, Preston v Star City Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 1273 (1 February 2000).  
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offered a series of inducements to gamble, despite having requested exclusion 
from the casino: 
Looked at in the light of ordinary concepts of fair and just dealing, it is at 
least arguably wrong, morally and ethically, for a casino operator by 
conscious and deliberate policy to prey upon a patron known by the 
operator to be a compulsive gambler.162
Justice Harper also stated that, arguably, the plaintiff himself bore some 
responsibility for his losses and was not necessarily entitled to a remedy for 
his losses.
 
163
Harper J eventually held that, although Kakavas was a ‘pathological gambler’, 
this did not affect his bargaining power with Crown.
 However, it may be argued that the responsibility for the 
plaintiff, in light of his gambling problems, was assumed by the casino itself 
when it elected to assist the plaintiff in taking out a self-exclusion order.  
164 It was accepted that 
Kakavas’ judgment ‘when set against the judgment of the generality of 
members of the community, was overly influenced by a desire to gamble’.165 
However, ‘equality in bargaining power may be possible even if the plaintiff 
is under a disability’.166
VI CONCLUSION 
 For such reasons, inter alia, Kakavas’ claim of 
unconscionable conduct failed. However, Harper J went on to state that this 
does not mean that a casino may never act unconscientiously in its dealings 
with a pathological gambler. Examples of instances where a casino does act 
unconscientiously were not proffered by his Honour.  
Voluntary self-exclusion programs were introduced in response to the 
growing concern about the impact of problem gambling on individuals, 
families and the community. However, there is little evidence that such 
programs are effective. To the extent that the operation of the programs relies 
merely on ‘facial recognition’ to exclude patrons, then, inevitably, a 
proportion of excluded gamblers will be able to re-enter the gaming venue. 
This article has shown that there are few effective legal sanctions against a 
gaming venue that has failed to exclude a gambler after he or she enters the 
voluntary exclusion program. In part, this is as a result of the courts adopting 
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an unsympathetic view of problem gamblers and stressing the individual 
responsibility of the problem gambler. It has been suggested that this 
approach is not appropriate, in particular in cases where a problem gambler 
has taken steps to deal with the problem by entering into a self-exclusion 
program. In these circumstances it can be argued that the gaming venue has 
undertaken some responsibility for the well-being of the gambler, and created 
an expectation that it will, at the very least, do everything reasonably within 
its power to monitor and prevent the problem gambler from re-entering the 
venue for the purpose of gambling. As discussed above, it may be queried 
whether this responsibility is fulfilled.  
If regulatory authorities are genuinely concerned with assisting problem 
gamblers through voluntary self-exclusion programs, then regulation of those 
programs need to be strengthened. There should be a requirement for 
regulatory review and reporting to an independent body of the success of the 
system. Moreover, gaming venues should be ‘encouraged’ to introduce better 
detection measures for gamblers, for example through the use of smart card 
technology. Further, in instances where a gambling corporation has failed to 
do everything reasonably within its power to monitor and prevent a self-
excluded problem gambler, it should be made liable for its actions. Currently 
the system is ineffective in achieving its objectives and its very existence may 
distract attention from genuine efforts to assist problem gamblers. 
